Mongol military tactics and organization

The Mongol military tactics and organization helped the Mongols to conquer nearly all of continental Asia, the Middle East and parts of eastern Europe. In many ways, it can be regarded as the first “modern” military system.

The original foundation of that system was a direct extension of the nomadic lifestyle of the Mongols. Other elements were newly invented by Genghis Khan, his generals, and his successors. Technologies useful to attack fortifications were adapted from other cultures, and foreign technical experts integrated into the command structures.

For the larger part of the 13th century, the Mongols only lost a few battles using that system, but always returned to turn the result around in their favour. In many cases, they won against significantly larger opponent armies. Their first real defeat came in the Battle of Ain Jalut in 1260, against the first army who had ben specifically trained to use their own tactics against them. That battle ended the western expansion of the Mongolian Empire. But while the empire became divided at around the same time, its combined size and influence remained largely intact for more than another hundred years.

Organization

Decimal system

Genghis Khan organized the Mongol soldiers into groups based on the decimal system. Units were recursively built from groups of 10 (Arban), 100 (Yaghun), 1,000 (Minghan), and 10,000 (Tumen), each with a leader reporting to the next higher level. Tumens, and sometimes Minghans, were commanded by a Noyan, who was often given the task to administrate specific conquered territories. From two to five Tumens would then form a hordu meaning army corps or field army, from which the word “Horde” is derived, under the command of the Khans or their generals (boyan).

The leaders on each level had significant license to execute their orders in the way they considered best. This command structure proved to be highly flexible and allowed the Mongol army to attack en masse, divide into somewhat smaller groups to encircle and lead enemies into an ambush, or divide into small groups of 10 to mop up a fleeing and broken army.

Breaking tribal connections

When integrating new soldiers into the army, Genghis Khan divided the soldiers under different leaders to break up the social and tribal connections, so that there was no division based on heritage of tribal alliances. Promotion was based only on merit. Each unit leader was responsible for the preparedness of his soldiers at any time and would be replaced if this was found lacking.

Promotions were granted on the basis of ability, not birth, with the possible exception of Genghis Khan’s relatives, who were given the highest levels of command. A good example would be Subutai, the son of a blacksmith (a very honorable profession, but nor normally predestinated for leadership).

In the Russian and East European campaigns for example, nominal command went to Batu Khan, the grandson of Genghis. Two other princes of the Blood commanded wings of that army. But all three Princes were under the operational control of Subutai. Upon receiving word of the death of Ögedei Khan (son and successor of the Great Khan himself) in 1243, it was Subutai who reluctantly reminded his three princes of their dynastic duties and ordered the Tumens to ride back home, sparing Europe from further devastation.

Training

Most European armies consisted of a few professional men at arms, and Knights, and large levies of peasants or militia. Only the Knights and the few professional fighting men trained regularly, and their training emphasized individual combat, such as jousting, rather than group combat tactics. The Mongol armies, by contrast, constantly practiced horsemanship, archery, and unit tactics, formations and rotations. This hard training was maintained by a hard, but not overly harsh or unreasonable, discipline.

Maneuver, diversion, firepower, shock and combined arms were emphasized at all levels of command. Officers and troopers alike were usually given a wide leeway by their superiors in carrying out their orders, so long as the larger objectives of the plan were well served and the orders promptly obeyed. The Mongols thus avoided the pitfalls of overly rigid discipline and micromanagement which have proven a hobgoblin to armed forces throughout history.

One unique training method that the Mongols used was huge hunts organized annually on the steppe. The Mongol horsemen would make a great circle, and drive all manner of animals in towards the center. Practicing the dynamic manoeuvres that would also be used on a battlefield, the Mongols would trap all the animals of various types in their encirclement, and on the order of their commander, begin the slaughter. This was an excellent way for the Mongols to train, and enjoy the recreation of hunting, as well as gather huge amounts of food for massive feasts.

Supply

The Mongol armies traveled very light, and were able to live largely off the land. Their equipment included fish hooks and other equipment meant to make each warrior independent of any fixed supply source. The most common travel food of the Mongols was dried and ground meat “Borts”, which is still common in the Mongolian cuisine today. Borts is light and easy to transport, and can be cooked with water similarly to a modern “instant soup”.

To ensure they would always have fresh horses, each trooper had five spare mounts. And since most of the Mongols’ mounts were mares, they could live off their horses’ milk or milk products when need arose. Wagons and carts carried large stockpiles of arrows, which were then put on the backs of camels (the Mongols’ favorite beasts of burden after the horse) who would travel along with the spare mounts. So a Mongol trooper was rarely for want of munitions, a fresh horse or fresh milk. The main logistical factor limiting the Hordus’ advance, was finding enough feed and water for their animals.

Intelligence services

Their incredible intelligence organization combined with centralized command to demonstrate remarkable ability to coordinate armies separated by great distances. In addition, their spies were among the world’s best. They carefully scouted and spied out their enemies in advance of any invasion. For instance, prior to the invasion of Europe, Batu and Subutai sent spies for almost ten years into the heart of Europe, making maps of the old Roman roads, establishing trade routes, and determining the level of ability of each principality to resist invasion. They made well educated guesses as to the willingness of each principality to aid the others, and the level of ability of each to resist alone, and in toto.

Communication

The Mongols established a system of “iamy,” or postal-relay horse stations, thus creating a mail service much like the later Pony Express of the U.S. frontier era. The Mongol mail system was the first such empire-wide service since the Roman Empire. Additionally, Mongol battlefield communication relied on flags to communicate movement orders during combat.

Weapons

The reflex bows used by the Mongols were among the best of the age. Plate armor could be penetrated at close range, using special heavy arrows. Hitting targets up to 300 yards was possible, almost 50-100 yards more than the legendary English longbowmen. The Mongols used composite reflex bows on horseback and longbows while on the ground. (Their longbows could not be accurately fired on horseback, contrary to popular perception). They used a wide variety of arrows, depending on the target. Their laminated armor was lighter and allowed for the mobility crucial to the Mongol battlefield tactics. Their horses were unmatched in the world for endurance and training.

Mobility

They showed mobility unheard of by armies of the time–up to 100 miles/day. Their ability to live off the land, combined with their ability to move so swiftly on horseback made their armies far less dependent on the traditional logistical apparatus of western agrarian armies. During the invasion of Russia, the Mongols used frozen rivers as literal highways, and winter, the time of year usually off limits for any major activity due to the intense cold, became the Mongol’s preferred time to strike.

Ruthlessness and Practicality

They were extremely ruthless in battle. They used terror as a weapon. They knew that fixed populations were not free to flee danger, as nomad populations were, and knew also that destruction of their cities was the worst a fixed population could expect. They made use of that fear by destroying a few cities, then usually having the remainder quickly surrender to avoid the same fate. The reputation for terror was so great there were tales of lone Mongol soldiers riding into villages and killing the inhabitants one by one, without resistance as it was known that to resist was to bring forth the whole of the Mongol army[1]. The Mongols were a well disciplined force readily assimilating advanced siege technology. When they slaughtered whole populations, they almost always spared the engineers and technicians, swiftly assimilating them into the Mongol armies. Finally, the Mongols regarded the European fixation with “honor” and glory in battle as absurd. They were concerned with one thing, and one thing only: winning and conquest. How they did so was of no concern, so long as they prevailed. While the Knight and Samurai were determined to cement their places in history with deeds of daring, the Mongols were busy conquering the world, or virtually all of it. Except for India, Arabia and the south-east, the Mongol’s conquered all of Asia.

Battlefield tactics

The Mongols were masters of the feigned retreat, which is perhaps the most difficult battlefield tactic to execute. Pretending disarray and defeat, they would turn and run, only to pivot when the enemy was drawn out, and destroy them at their leisure.

The tomens would typically advance on a broad front, five lines deep. The first three lines would be comprised of horse archers, the last two of lancers. Once an enemy force was located, the Mongols would try and avoid risky or reckless frontal assaults (in sharp contrast to their European and Middle-Eastern opponents). Instead they would use diversionary attacks to fix the enemy in place, while their main forces sought to outflank or surround the foe. First the horse archers would lay down a withering barrage of arrow fire. Additional arrows were carried by camels who followed close by, ensuring a plentiful supply of ammunition.

To avoid the deadly hail of missiles, enemies would frequently spread out, or seek cover, breaking up their formations and making them more vulnerable to the lancers’ charges. Likewise, when they packed themselves together, into dense square or phalanx style formations, they would become more vulnerable to the arrows. Once the enemy was deemed sufficiently weakened, the noyans would give the order and the drums would beat and the signal flags wave, telling the lancers to begin their charge. Often the devastation of the arrows was enough to rout an enemy, so the lancers were only needed to help pursue and mop up the remnants.

When facing European armies, with their emphasis on heavy cavalry, it was obviously not the Mongol’s style to engage in heavy melee combat against a strong and unshaken foe, but rather picked off the heavy cavalry at long distances with their bows. In the few cases where armor actually withstood their arrows, the Mongols simply killed the Knight’s horses, leaving a heavily armored man afoot, unable to go any distance. At the Battle of Mohi, the Mongols left open a gap in their ranks, luring the Hungarians into retreating through it, which resulted in their being strung out over all the countryside, and easy pickings for mounted archers who simply galloped along and picked them off, while the lancers skewered them as they fled. At Legnica, the Teutonic, Templar and Hospitaller knights were able to make a stand dismounted, and inflicted unusually heavy casualties on the Mongols – but were killed in the end. The Mongols simply accepted the casualties, and destroyed the Knights, who were outnumbered.

The Mongol battlefield tactics were a combination of masterful training combined with excellent communication and the ability to follow orders in the chaos of combat. They trained for virtually every possibility, so when it occurred, they could react accordingly. Unlike many of their foes, the Mongols also protected their ranking officers well. Their training and discipline allowed them to fight without the need for constant supervision or rallying, which often placed commanders in dangerous positions.

Whenever possible, Mongol commanders found the highest ground available, from where they could make tactical decisions based on the best view of the battlefield as events unfolded. Furthermore, being on high ground allowed their forces to observe commands conveyed by flags more easily than if the ground were level. In addition, keeping the high command on high ground made them easier to defend. Unlike the European armies, which placed enormous emphasis on personal valor, and thus exposed their leaders to death from anyone bold enough to kill them, the Mongols regarded their leaders as a vital asset. A general such as Subutai, unable to ride a horse in the later part of his career, due to age and obesity, would have been ridiculed out of most any European army of the time. No one would have respected him, let alone obeyed his orders. But the Mongols recognized and respected the still powerful military mind buried within the old fat man, who after all, had been one of the Genghis Khan’s most able subbordinates, and so they cheerfully hauled him around in a cart. This in stark contrast to the fate of Frederick Barbarossa, who drowned attempting to ford a river in his old age.

Areas that Avoided Mongol Conquest

Essentially, only four areas accessible to the Mongols avoided conquest by them — Vietnam, Japan, Western Europe and Arabia. Why did the Mongols not go on, and conquer Europe as easily as they did Russia? The most popular explanation was the fact that on 11 December 1241, during pre-emptive operations by Mongol reconnaissance forces inside Austria for the invasion of Vienna, news came that Ogedei Khan died, and bound by Mongol tradition, all Mongol commanders and princes had to report back to the capital of Karakorum to elect a new Khan. It was believed that the Mongol abandonment of the European campaign was only temporary, but in fact, the Mongols had committed no further campaigns into Europe in earnest. Some western historians attribute European survival to Mongol unwillingness to fight in the more densely populated German principalities, where the wetter weather affected their bows. But the same weather did not stop them from devastating Russia, and Europe was far less densely populated than China.”[1] The probable answer for the Mongol’s stopping after the Mohi River, and the destruction of the Hungarian army, was that they never intended to advance further at that time.[2] [3]

Batu Khan had made his Russian conquests safe for the next 10 generations, and when the Great Khan died, he rushed back to Mongolia to put in his claim for power. Upon his return, relations with his cousin Guyuk Khan had deteriorated to the point that open warfare between them came shortly after Guyuk’s death. Had the Great Khan given Batu, and Subutai, who was planning an invasion of central Europe, the forces to mount such, it would have doubtless conquered with relative ease. The point is that the Mongols were unable to bring a unified army to bear on either Europe, or Egypt, after 1260. Bluntly, had the Mongol Great Khanate remained intact, and not fallen apart due to infighting between the various cousins, the European powers and the Mamluke Sultanate would have either surrendered to the authority of the Great Khan, or more likely, been conquered and razed. Batu Khan was in fact planning invasion of Europe all the way to the “Great Sea,” the Atlantic Ocean, when he died in 1255.[2] [3]

His son inherited the Khanate, but also died in a short time, and Batu’s brother Berke became Khan of the Kipchak Khanate. He was far more interested in fighting with his cousin Hulagu than invading the remainder of Europe, which was no threat to him.

Another area that wasn’t conquered by mongols was Vietnam, which repelled mongol attacks in 1257, 1285 and 1287/1288. Japan also repelled massive Mongol invasions in 1274 and 1281. But had the Great Khan concentrated on one or the other, instead of attempting to conquer both virtually similtaneously, he would probably have conquered both. In both cases, he sent part of the Mongol armies, instead of concentrating on Vietnam first, and then Japan. Furthermore, the splitting of resources left the Mongols with a fleet that was not readily equipped for the storms that plagued the Sea of Japan. A great storm sank the primary invasion fleet and killed most of the Mongol army during the 1281 invasion. Nonetheless, Kublai Khan continued to attempt to gather forces for another invasion while similtaneously attacking Vietnam. The end result was both areas were able to repell Mongol assaults.[2]

The final area to withstand the Mongols was northern Africa and part of Arabia. The Mamluks successfully defended the Holy Land because Berke Khan came to their aid after his cousin enraged him by sacking Baghdad, (Berke was a Muslim, and sent word to the Great Khan that he would “call him to account(Hulugu Khan), for he has murdered the Caliph in Baghdad, and killed all the faithful.”[1] This Mongol against Mongol fighting, after the Mamluks defeated the Mongols at Ain Jalut in 1260 ultimately did what no single foe could do, and brought down the Mongol Empire.

References
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Hildinger, Erik, Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to A.D. 1700 *Morgan, David — The Mongols, ISBN 0-631-17563-6
Jones Archer ., — Art of War in the Western World [1]
May, Timothy. “The Mongol Art of War.” [1] Westholme Publishing, Yardley. 2007.
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